Establishing some in-house control, in the wake of Facebook's rise as a gaming platform, is an important ongoing issue for operators in the social network gaming space. Founding a presence that, to varying degrees, provides some independence is of great benefit to operators, as they wrest control and recoup more of the value chain. The cost of acquiring a userbase, however, can also rise, making this an essential but tricky ongoing balancing act for social network gaming companies to explore.

Facebook's proposition as a games platform is as conditional as it is appealing. It presents an enormous addressable market that, by definition, has an equally potent social graph in tow, that has allowed game operators to leverage multiple, ever-evolving techniques for achieving scale in their userbases. However, two major movements in the past year have highlighted just how vulnerable an operator can be when functioning entirely in a platform owner's shadow: virality and monetisation.

The toning down of viral potential in Facebook's channels has been well-documented already, and has left operators needing to invest in either innovative techniques for acquisition, or simply face higher CPAs, demonstrating how the needs of Facebook outrank those of app publishers. The same is true of Facebook's Credits system, a first-party virtual currency and payment platform that has been gradually adopted by many operators in the past year, and is due to become compulsory in July 2011. The 30% share of revenue due to Facebook for any purchase of Credits isn't excessive in contrast to other platforms (such as Xbox 360's Live Marketplace and the App Store for iOS devices), but it could alter the value proposition of operating on Facebook for those that have relied on third-party payment solutions in the past two years, whose revenue share is lower (typically anywhere between 5-15%). The impact on margins, and any subsequent migration of operations, will be felt in the second half of this year.

That Playdom's portal requires a separate login, rather than Facebook Connect, is telling, as it draws a line in terms of ownership of the user. Ditto its payment platform, which ignores Facebook Credits, and employs several third-party solution providers (who must also be feeling the squeeze from Facebook's lockdown of its own payment platform). Zynga, by contrast, continues to allow players of its iOS games to login with their Facebook accounts, thus taking advantage of a streamlined sign-up process, but also compromising their ownership of users. Social network gaming operators considering long-term growth in the wider ecosystem of online gaming will need to enact a dynamic compromise between working with platform partners while also maintaining a relatively detached in-house agenda.